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Abstract 1 
Mental causation is a predominantly theoretical topic rather than a topic studied in the laboratory. The 2 
purpose of this paper is to outline a general approach for studying mental causation by empirical means 3 
for philosophers and scientists interested in the topic. The aim is to outline how we can infer mental 4 
causation by empirical methods given an unknown solution to the mind-body problem. The approach is 5 
based on the principles of causal inference to find causal relations among observed variables used in all 6 
branches of science. With these principles, it is possible to estimate the causal effects of mental events:  7 
Make an experimental manipulation on a mental event, control confounding variables, and estimate 8 
causal effects on the outcome. The caveat is that we cannot separate the causal effects of a mental event 9 
from the physical base of the mental event, independent of whether we assume mental events can be 10 
reduced to their physical base. A challenge to estimating causal effects of mental events is that 11 
measured physical variables, such as electrophysiological potentials from the brain, might reflect 12 
processes that are part of “higher-order” phenomena, such as mental events. This means that 13 
controlling “downwards” for confounding variables is challenging. It is, however, not impossible. It 14 
also means that inferring non-mental causes of action cannot be done by measuring only physical 15 
variables alone. Keeping the mind-body problem in mind when designing experiments, it is possible to 16 
infer mental causation.   17 
 18 
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1 Introduction 1 
Do mental events cause physical action, and if so, how? This is the central question in the topic of 2 
mental causation. One ought to think that investigating mental causation is a goal of experimental 3 
psychology—but experiments directly addressing mental causation are surprisingly sparse. Even 4 
though a massive advancement in neuroscience methods has given experimental psychology and 5 
neuroscience tools to study the biological basis of mental events, there has been little attempt at a 6 
framework for empirical investigations of mental causation. Mental causation is predominantly a 7 
theoretical topic with close to no contribution from experimental science. 8 
The central problem in addressing mental causation is the mind-body problem. The mind-body 9 
problem, in a nutshell, is that we do not know how mental events relates to physical states. Without 10 
knowing how they are related, we do not know how they interact. The mind-body problem makes it 11 
difficult to define the pre-empirical foundation for experimental inference about mental causation. We 12 
assume the brain is the foundation of the mind, but since we do not know how they are related, it is 13 
unclear what assumptions we have to make to include mental events when inferring causal relations. 14 
The mind-body problem appears to be an obstacle to describing the foundation for investigating mental 15 
causation by empirical means.  16 
The purpose of this paper is to sketch a foundation for an experimental approach that scientists and 17 
empirical oriented philosophers can use to study mental causation. How do we go from the analytical 18 
approach to understanding mental causation to instead gain an understanding via experimental 19 
inference? Furthermore, how do we distinguish between the type of questions we must deal with by 20 
analytical reasoning and those questions we can answer by empirical means? 21 
Given the unknown relationship between mental events and the physical world—the mind-body 22 
problem—I will explore to what extent we can make meaningful inference about mental causation. As 23 
we must be aware of what we can (and cannot) infer from experimental studies on mental causation, I 24 
will make the necessary assumptions explicit and acknowledge limitations in the experimental designs. 25 
Finally, I will answer the following questions: what type of questions about mental causation can we 26 
answer through experimental procedures? And what possible caveats must we avoid to draw the right 27 
conclusions from experimental studies?  28 
2 
In the following sections, I discuss how we deal with mental and physical phenomena as experimental 29 
variables and outline how we can use them to make inference about causal relations, how the variables 30 
relate to analytical problems, and how this relation sets the foundation for an empirical approach to 31 
studying mental causation.  32 
2 Mental variables and physical variables 33 
The analytical approach to studying mental causation focus on how any ideal mental event M and any 34 
ideal physical event P can (or cannot) interact. In contrast, empirical science deals with observed data 35 
to infer relations amongst the events the variables represent. When taking an empirical approach, our 36 
first assumption is that mental and physical events are real and that we can measure and/or manipulate 37 
them. To measure and manipulate mental event, they need to be operationalized as experimental 38 
variables. 39 
The first hurdle is that the term mental event has different meanings in different discussions. It can refer 40 
to specific mental content occurring within a limited time window or refer to general states, e.g., a 41 
transient intention to move one’s arm versus a general state of wakefulness or being in a coma (Hohwy, 42 
2009; Laureys, 2005). There is no clear-cut definition of mental events; partly due to the uncertainty in 43 
defining the nature of mentality, to begin with. The content of mental events can refer to 44 
phenomenological properties or cognitive properties (Block, 2005; Cohen and Dennett, 2011). The 45 
precise definition of mental events is not of importance: as long as we can accept that mental events 46 
exist—either as phenomenological states or cognitive processes—then we can operationalize these as 47 
mental variables in experimental settings. Thus, mental events can be defined by their 48 
phenomenological content, or they can be defined from a cognitive perspective without referring to 49 
phenomenology. 50 
If we are strict, we could argue that because the phenomenological content of mental events is available 51 
only to the subject, we can never measure them. We can for example never know if subjects have 52 
inverted qualia, or if they are philosophical zombies (Chalmers, 1997). There is no practical solution to 53 
this problem, but this does not exclude mental variables from being meaningful in experimental 54 
contexts (Overgaard et al., 2008; Seth et al., 2005; Tononi and Koch, 2015). 55 
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Subjective reports or behavioral responses might not be “direct” access to phenomenological content, 56 
but they serve as indirect indications that mental events are occurring. We see indirect variables in all 57 
branches of science: when measuring distortion of light as an indication of cosmic bodies due to 58 
gravitational bends, and in neuroimaging where the blood-oxygen flow in areas of the brain is a proxy 59 
of neuronal activity (Logothetis et al., 2001). We accept these indirect measurements because the link 60 
between the indirect measure (light distortion; oxygen-blood flow) and the object (cosmic body; neural 61 
activity) is based on assumptions that we agree upon (strong gravitation bends light; active neurons are 62 
associated with higher blood flow). 63 
To obtain a mental variable that indicates that a subject is experiencing a particular mental event is 64 
sufficient for it to be an experimental variable. We can measure mental events, by obtaining 65 
introspective reports about the mental events or other indications that subjects are experiencing certain 66 
mental events (Overgaard et al., 2008). What we obtain by these methods are mental variables. For 67 
mental variables to be valid, they have to be consistent as any other variable. Mental variables should 68 
exclusively capture the event they are intended to measure while exhaustively capturing any occurrence 69 
of the mental event (Jensen et al., 2017; Reingold and Merikle, 1988). 70 
We are not required to know the ontological reality of the mental events that the mental variables 71 
measure, i.e., we do not need to impose a predefined solution to the mind-body problem to use mental 72 
variables in cognitive neuroscience. If we can trust our methods of obtaining mental variables, then we 73 
have indications that the mental events are occurring, and we are justified in using these as variables in 74 
experimental studies. 75 
Physical events seem more intuitive than mental events, but, upon further inquiry, it is not 76 
straightforward what constitutes a physical event (Crane and Mellor, 1990; Melnyk, 1997; Smart, 77 
1978). Intuitively, we can easily characterize different events, such as a neuron firing, cerebral blood-78 
flow, or the force of an accelerating mass as physical events. Although only the latter is the described 79 
in the scientific language of physics, we consider all previous examples as physical events. That we 80 
consider the above as physical phenomena are because we not have any reason to assume their 81 
existence is dependent on anything that violates the language of physics (Stoljar, 2001). In this sense, 82 
cognitive and neural processes—from single neurons to whole-brain network communications—are all 83 
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physical phenomena. Whatever we measure in cognitive neuroscience that relates back to the 84 
biophysical properties of the brain or body is in this context a physical variable. 85 
The challenge of using an empirical approach to studying mental causation is how to combine mental 86 
variables and physical variables in experiments to infer their causal relation. Another factor that adds to 87 
this challenge is that there are likely as many definitions of causation as there are definitions of mental 88 
events. Despite disagreements, there is one prevailing view of how to make causal inference in science. 89 
In the next section, I give a brief overview of the general principles of causal inference and then return 90 
to how we can use these principles to make inference about mental causation. 91 
3 The principles of causal inference 92 
The causal effect of X is the difference X would make on the outcome Y, based on the counterfactual 93 
conditions of X being present or not. Say we want to know whether X (a drug) cause Y (a fever 94 
reduction). Depending on the intervention the variable X takes the values X=1 (taking the medication) 95 
or X=0 (not taking the medication). Y is the measured outcome of the counterfactual conditions, as 96 
Y(X=1) and Y(X=0). If X is causing Y, then Y will follow X=1 but not X=0. Thus, the causal effect of X 97 
on Y is the measured difference between Y(X=1) and Y(X=0). The causal effect is a numerical quantity 98 
that indicates the difference between the counterfactual conditions of X and not X (Rubin, 1974; 99 
Woodward, 2005).  100 
In reality, both conditions cannot occur: a subject cannot take the pill (X=1) and at the same time not 101 
take the pill (X=0). Only one of the counterfactual conditions can occur for the particular case. The true 102 
causal effect for any single case cannot be estimated. Empirical inference of causal effects instead 103 
approximates the true causal effect. This is done by having several independent occurrences of the 104 
relation we are investigating. We then expose half of the cases to the condition X=1. This is the 105 
intervention group. The other half of the cases are kept the same without the intervention (X=0). For 106 
each case i exposed to the intervention, we measure the outcome Yi(Xi=1), and for each instance j not 107 
exposed to the intervention, we measure Yj(Xj=0) (Table 1). The mean difference between the two 108 
conditions estimates the true causal effect. The mean difference between the columns Y(X=1) and 109 
Y(X=0) in Table 1 is the estimated causal effect of X on Y (Rubin, 1974). 110 
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Table 1: Data frame for estimating the causal effect of variable X on outcome variable Y. 112 
case X Y(X=1) Y(X=0) Y(X=1)-Y(X=0) 
i1 1 10 NA NA 
j1 0 NA 0 NA 
i2 1 11 NA NA 
j2 0 NA 0 NA 
i3 1 9 NA NA 
j3 0 NA 0 NA 
MEAN  10 0 10 
 113 
For the causal effect to be a measure of causality—not just a correlation between two measurements—114 
the intervention on X must be the only systematic change between conditions (Rubin, 1974; 115 
Woodward, 2012). In reality, however, there is always variation between single cases. The variation 116 
can come from several sources: imprecision in the measurements, noise in the environment, or 117 
variation inherent in what we denote as events of type X. We have to take variability between cases into 118 
account in the estimation of causal effects. 119 
Random variation, unrelated to the intervention, is a minor problem as it will cancel out (to some 120 
degree) with an adequate number of cases. But if the variability between cases covaries with the 121 
intervention, it will invalidate the causal inference. It must be assumed that the intervention on X is the 122 
only variable that affects Y to make a valid causal inference. If systematic variation between groups 123 
occurs, it cannot be ruled out that the change in Y is due to confounding variables rather than X. It is 124 
important to control for systematic confounding background variables (i.e., any other variable than X 125 
and Y). Control of background variables is done by random sampling and systematic matching of 126 
background variables before making the intervention (Ahern et al., 2009; Rubin, 1974; Stuart, 2010). 127 
We can measure the background variables as separate variables B1, B2...Bn to ensure their distributions 128 
are similar between conditions. E.g., B1 and B3 in Table 2 appear to have similar distributions between 129 
cases i and j, but there seems to be a problematic difference between groups in B2. Good experimental 130 
design requires adequate control of possible confounding variables. 131 
 132 
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Table 2: Expanded data frame for estimating the causal effect of X on Y. 133 
case B1 B2 B3 X Y(X=1) Y(X=0) Y(X=1)-Y(X=0) 
i1 5 1 3 1 10 NA NA 
j1 4 10 2 0 NA 0 NA 
i2 6 0 1 1 11 NA NA 
j2 5 11 3 0 NA 0 NA 
i3 4 2 2 1 9 NA NA 
j3 6 9 1 0 NA 0 NA 
MEAN i=5, j=5 I=1, j=10  i=1, j=1  10 0 10 
 134 
The estimated causal effect does not tell exactly what the true causal effect is for single cases: it is a 135 
generalized effect of type X events on type Y events (Dawid, 2000; Holland, 1986; Rubin, 1974). The 136 
estimated causal effect tells the probability of Y following X in the case that Y is a binary variable. If Y 137 
is a parametric variable, the causal effect is a numeric value indicating how much we expect X to 138 
change Y (Woodward and Hitchcock, 2003), e.g., ten “units” in the example in Table 1. In the 139 
following, whenever I refer to causal effect, I am referring to the estimated causal effect. 140 
Causal effects are not truths in the logical sense. The causal effects are probabilistic relations between 141 
events estimated under controlled conditions that allow us to apply counterfactual logic to conclude a 142 
causal connection. For example, when testing if a new drug reduces fever, we do not need to describe 143 
how the chemical compound is absorbed in the body, passing the bloodstream, etc. to estimate the 144 
causal effect of the drug. As long as we have a causal effect of X on Y obtained under convincing 145 
circumstances, we can justify the conclusion that there is a causal relation between X and Y. 146 
4 Causal inference for mental events 147 
We can estimate the causal effects of mental events M in a similar way to how we estimate any other 148 
causal effect: the mental events are the variables we manipulate, and the behavioral outcome is the 149 
dependent variable we measure. Say we want to investigate if the intention to move one’s arm cause 150 
one to move the arm: following the reasoning in the previous section, we can make an experimental 151 
manipulation so that subjects experience a specific mental event M (intention to move arm) in some 152 
conditions and not in others, while keeping all other variables constant, measure the outcome Y 153 
(physical movement of arm) for contrasting conditions, and estimate the causal effect of M on Y. M is a 154 
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cause of Y if there exists some intervention on M that changes the value of Y while keeping everything 155 
else equal (Woodward, 2012). The causal effect of M on Y is the mean difference between cases, for 156 
cases with M=1 and cases with and M=0, assuming there is no other systematic variation between the 157 
conditions. Causal inference with mental events is, like any other causal inference, estimated 158 
probabilistic relations between events. The inferred relations are the generalized effect of mental events 159 
of type M on type Y events. 160 
To infer mental causation from experiments, we need several instances of the same mental event. We 161 
need to ensure that the mental events, which we conceptualize as experimental variable M, is similar 162 
enough across the entire experiment and between subjects that we can justify that they belong to the 163 
same type of mental event and estimate causal inference. E.g., if investigating the causal effect of the 164 
intention to move the hand, it must be assured that the intention is functional or phenomenological 165 
equivalent across cases. It is impossible to know if the intention to move is phenomenological identical 166 
between subjects as the experience is only available to the subjects, but this does not invalidate using it 167 
in causal inference. While we cannot assume that two similar behaviors are followed by similar mental 168 
states between subjects, we can make sure that the accompanying mental events are consistent. By 169 
measuring the mental events through introspective reports, we assess whether subjects describe the 170 
mental events in a consistent manner across subjects (Overgaard et al., 2008).  171 
The problem of mental causation is often framed as whether any mental event can have any causal 172 
relevance in the physical world. This question is not suited for experimental research. Estimated causal 173 
effects apply to the events for which they were estimated. If we show one type of mental event Ma to be 174 
causally relevant (or irrelevant) for the outcome Y, then this does not mean that other mental events Mb, 175 
Mc, etc. have the same level of relevance. It is not given that the experience of red or the intention to go 176 
on vacation has the same causal relevance for moving one’s arm as the intention to move the arm just 177 
because all are examples of mental events. They are different mental events. To conclude that the 178 
causal properties of one type of mental event apply to all mental events is an error analogous to 179 
concluding that the effect of one kind of drug applies to all kinds of drugs. Experimental studies of 180 
mental causation must be specific about what type of mental events they are dealing with. 181 
In conclusion, to study mental causation with experimental research, we treat mental variables as any 182 
other experimental variable. But of course, if it is this simple, mental causation would not be a 183 
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controversial topic. The premise of this framework is that we do not know how mental events fit into 184 
the physical world. The unknown relation between mental events and physical events makes causal 185 
inference a peculiar enterprise. But it is not as difficult as one might think if we are aware of the mind-186 
body problem. 187 
4.1 Dealing with the special nature of mental events 188 
To investigate the causal effects of mental events, we must first assume that mental events are related 189 
to the physical world. We do not need to assume how mental events are related to the physical world, 190 
we only assume that mental events depend on the physical world. This assumption is easy to justify: 191 
sensory inputs from the environment cause perceptions, intentions are directed towards the physical 192 
world, and particular neural activity is related to mental content (Aru et al., 2012; Chalmers, 2000). 193 
We can make this assumption explicit: for each mental event M, there exists at least one physical event 194 
P, which is the minimal physical event necessary for instantiating M (for the given occurrence of M). 195 
This is different from stating that mental events are physical events. If we prefer, we can view mental 196 
events as non-physical properties. But if so, they are attached to the physical events that cause them.  197 
How mental and physical events interact is still unknown: do the interaction go from the physical to the 198 
mental or can it go both ways? If the relation between M and P is one-directional, then mental events 199 
cannot produce causal effects. If mental events are causally irrelevant, then we hardly need an 200 
empirical approach to study them. 201 
To outline the problem: we want to know if M can cause Y given M is bound by its physical base P 202 
(Figure 1). How we view the relation between M and P determines if this problem shows that mental 203 
causation is impossible. 204 
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Figure 1: Outline of the problem: Can M—realized by P—be a cause of Y? 206 
The first solution is to assume an identity relation between M and P, where the two events are the same 207 
singular event: any difference in appearance is only epistemological (e.g., Smart, 1959). The apparent 208 
dichotomy between physical and mental stems from the event being measured as either the physical 209 
variable P or as the mental variable M. The statements “M causes Y” and “P causes Y” are describing 210 
the same relation. If P is the cause of Y then so is M by definition. In the case of M and P sharing an 211 
identity, there is one causal factor that can influence Y. 212 
In this case, mental variables are another type of physical variable, and it is valid to treat them like any 213 
other variable for the purpose of causal inference. If we measure either M as a mental variable or its 214 
physical base P, we would measure the same event twice. If we observe only one of either M or P, we 215 
automatically have proof that the other identity is present as well. This also gives that intervening on 216 
either M or P is an intervention on the same event. For inferential purposes, we must collapse M and P 217 
into a single causal factor MP (Figure 2).  218 
 219 
Figure 2: In the case of M=P, any intervention I that change M will be an intervention on MP. 220 
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On the other hand, we can take M to be different from P. The occurrence of M is still dependent on P 221 
(given the initial assumption), but M is a (non-reductive) supervenient property of P. The difference in 222 
appearance is not just epistemological: the difference between a mental variable measuring M and a 223 
physical variable measuring P each captures some underlying features that are non-overlapping. 224 
Though M and P are ontologically distinct, P is both a sufficient and necessary condition for M. For M 225 
to be present so must P and when P is present, so is M. For M to be the cause of Y, P must be a physical 226 
cause of Y. To avoid Y being overdetermined there can only be one cause of Y, so either M or P must be 227 
removed as the cause of Y. If the physical world is causally closed, then P cannot be eliminated. Hence, 228 
P is a sufficient cause of any change in Y we would ascribe to M. M is an epiphenomenon and is 229 
excluded from the causal relation (Kim, 2005). Only the solid arrow in Figure 1 describes the real 230 
causal connection between M, P, and Y. 231 
If we take M as a supervenient property of P, then mental variables measure different phenomena than 232 
the physical variables do. But since P is sufficient and necessary for M, we run into problems if we try 233 
to isolate either and estimate causal effects. 234 
Imagine an experiment where we have a brain stimulator that can target—and only targets—non-235 
physical mental events without affecting any physical events. We use the non-physical stimulator to 236 
induce the intention to move one’s arm (M=1) in a group of subjects. We also have a control group that 237 
is not subjected to the non-physical stimulation and will not experience the intention to move their arms 238 
(M=0). Assume that the brains of the subjects, independent of group, all are in a given state P* at the 239 
moment before the intervention. P* is in no way related to the intention to move one’s arm. During the 240 
experiment, the brains of the control group will continue to be in state P*. When the non-physical 241 
stimulator induces the (non-reductive) intention to move in the intervention group, it must follow that 242 
the physical base P of the intention to move have to be present for M to be present. For the non-243 
physical intervention to change the value of M, it will follow that P* change to P (Baumgartner, 2009; 244 
Kim, 2005). It is impossible for M to change without a corresponding change in P. 245 
That both M and P change is a problem for causal inference: since P ≠ M, we must place P as a column 246 
in our matrix of confounding variables (Table 3). But if P is not present then neither is M: M and P 247 
covary. We can estimate a difference between the two groups, but we cannot determine if the effect is 248 
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caused by M or P: it is not possible to isolate the non-physical M as required for causal inference 249 
(Baumgartner, 2010, 2009). We cannot estimate the causal effect of a mental event alone. 250 
 251 
Table 3: Data frame for estimating the causal effect of mental event M on Y. M and its physical 252 
base P are perfect covariates. 253 
case B1 B2 P M Y(X=1) Y(X=0) Y(X=1)-Y(X=0) 
i1 5 3 1 1 10 NA NA 
j1 4 2 0 0 NA 0 NA 
i2 6 1 1 1 11 NA NA 
j2 5 3 0 0 NA 0 NA 
i3 4 2 1 1 9 NA NA 
j3 6 1 0 0 NA 0 NA 
MEAN     10 0 10 
 254 
 255 
Figure 3: In case M is a (non-reductive) supervenient property of P, any intervention I on M must be accompanied by 256 
a corresponding change in P. M and P cannot be separated as causal factors despite being ontologically different. The 257 
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same is true if we make an intervention I on P: Any intervention on either M or P will be an intervention on MP as a 258 
change in one will be accompanied by a change in the other. 259 
The covariation between M and P is not only an issue when isolating M as a causal factor. Imagine the 260 
same experiment above, but this time we use a different brain stimulator that intervenes on P and 261 
estimates the causal effect of P on Y (Figure 3, bottom diagram). In the intervention group, the brain-262 
states change from P* to P while the brain-states of the control group remain the same. Since P is the 263 
physical base of M then a change from P* to P will also induce M. As with the non-physical 264 
stimulation inducing M, we are not able to isolate P as the cause of Y. Even if we assume that M and P 265 
are different, it is impossible to separate them as causal factors: M and P are perfect covariates. 266 
Since we cannot separate M and P as causal factors, we have two options when it comes to causal 267 
inference: we can abandon the attempt of an empirical approach to mental causation, as we cannot 268 
construct an experiment where we isolate M and keep all other factors (including P) constant. Or we 269 
can collapse M and P into a single variable MP. 270 
Considering causal properties of mental events and their physical base as a single causal factor is not 271 
new in the analytical approach to mental causation (e.g., Kim, 2005; Lewis, 1994; Mele, 2009; Sperry, 272 
1980; Woodward, 2015). Here I argued for the same position as we cannot separate the two in practice: 273 
it is a practical necessity—not an ontological assumption. M and P can be ontologically different, but 274 
the isolation of the factor M from P is impossible no matter which of the above solutions to the mind-275 
body problem we prefer. This means that we cannot answer the question if a mental event or its 276 
physical base is the cause of action by empirical means. We can only answer if the mental event and its 277 
physical base as a single factor is the cause of action. For practical purposes, the causal relevance of a 278 
mental event M is the same as its physical base P. 279 
4.2 Reduction and causal explanations 280 
One could argue that we are reducing away real mental causation by always considering the causal 281 
properties of mental events together with their physical realization. This is only the case if we start with 282 
the position that mental causation per definition must be non-physical. If one feels that the concept of 283 
mental causation is reserved for “pure” mental causation, we can instead call the causal effects 284 
“mental-and-physical-base causation” and proceed.  285 
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One can still ask: since the causal effect of M only can be estimated together with P, can we then 286 
remove M from the causal relation and only deal with the physical variables? In principle, we can 287 
remove M from the causal explanation. But it is not feasible in practice. In reality, it is rarely the case 288 
that higher-order explanations can be reduced to statements involving fundamental physical processes, 289 
even in cases where we are justified in assuming the higher order phenomena are genuine reducible 290 
physical phenomena (Anderson, 1972; Bedau, 2002). The reason is that we do not understand what 291 
constitutes a physical base of a mental event. What real type of physical event P denotes in the 292 
examples above is undisclosed in the real world. It might be explanations involving neural anatomy, 293 
neural communication, or fundamental laws of physics. Even if we assume mental events are reducible, 294 
we do not have the relevant information to remove mental events from the inference of mental 295 
causation. 296 
Reductionism in practice is also problematic in the experimental setting. To estimate causal effects, we 297 
need several instances of the same mental event M, and we cannot guarantee that each occurrence of M 298 
is identical. Though each case has to be similar enough for the causal inference to be valid, we have to 299 
tolerate some variation in practice. The variation within an experimental variable opens the possibility 300 
that each case of M does not have the same physical base. This can be because of the uncertainties in 301 
the mental variables or because mental events can be realized by different physical events (Fodor, 302 
1974). Rather than thinking about M and P as ideal events, think of them as sets of similar events: M is 303 
the set of similar mental events M1, M2 … MN and P is a set of physical events P1, P2 … PN that each 304 
corresponds to the physical base of the mental events in M. Since is possible for the variable P to be a 305 
set of several different physical states we cannot assume that all elements in M can be collapsed with 306 
the same physical event Pi. Each mental event Mi must have its own corresponding physical base Pi. 307 
When considering the causal properties of each Mi, we cannot distinguish it from the causal properties 308 
of its physical base Pi, and we have to collapse each Mi and Pi into a single causal factor. The problem 309 
of separating M and P does not change, but it does change how we can control for confounding 310 
physical variables in causal inference. We have to deal with a practical form of multiple realizations of 311 
events, even if the events are reducible (Aizawa & Gillett, 2009). It is, thus, problematic to attempt to 312 
completely remove mental variables, by only measuring physical variables, as we cannot be sure that 313 
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we measure the correct underlying physical base in ever repetition—at least not with our current 314 
understanding of how the brain gives rise to mental events. 315 
Finally, removing mental events from inquiry about mental causation, even in ontologically possible, 316 
might not be desirable in practice. Low-level explanations do not always provide useful causal 317 
explanations. Causal explanations are about how some units of interest X have an impact on another 318 
unit of observation Y. The units of interest can be any phenomenon, e.g., brain processes, pills, social 319 
factors, or mental events. We can assume that X can be broken into pieces and explained as composites 320 
x1, x2, etc., and explain how the composites cause outcome Y. Replacing causal explanation involving X 321 
with an explanation about the composites have to take all the composite parts into account. The 322 
explanation involving the composites increase in complexity. The increase in complexity makes the 323 
required explanation more difficult and is contrary to the purpose of causal explanations (Lipton, 324 
2005). 325 
To say that a pill cause fever reduction does (in most cases) provide the information we want to know 326 
about the pill and its use—even if we have a full account of the chemical compounds in the pill and 327 
how they interact with the biophysical processes that regulate body temperature. Similar, to say that my 328 
intention to raise my arm is the cause raising my arm, is as valid a causal explanation as an explanation 329 
involving all the neural processes giving rise to my intention to raise my arm. One is not more correct 330 
than the other, but the first is a lot simpler than the latter. Since causal inference is relative effects of 331 
variables of interest, we can reverse the issue of reductionism and ask if we can remove physical 332 
variables and only consider the causal effects of mental variables? The proper level of analysis depends 333 
on the phenomena we are interested in. It is not necessary to regress to lower level explanations to 334 
explain the causation of higher-order events to address causation. 335 
The reason we want physical variables is that in the context of mental causation this is usually part of 336 
what we want to know: it is not if mental events can have causal effects, it is how they can have causal 337 
effects and how they interact with physical processes; e.g., how the intention to move the hand is part 338 
of the nervous system responsible for locomotion. How does the relative contribution from mental 339 
events and non-mental physical processes generate behavior? By combining mental variables and 340 
(physical) neuro-cognitive variables in experimental designs that we can answer these questions. 341 
15 
5 Towards a science of mental causation 342 
Combining mental variables and physical variables in causal inference is difficult, as we are dealing 343 
with variables who’s underlying ontology can be dependent on one another. When measuring blood 344 
flow in the brain or electrophysiological potentials, we do not know whether the measured activity is 345 
the physical base of mental event M, unrelated to M, or only a part of the physical base. The mental 346 
event and its physical base MP is not the only event occurring in the brain when we investigate the 347 
causal effect of MP. Isolating the neural base of a mental event is not as simple as observing which 348 
physical variables that co-vary with the mental variables. Any physical variable we measure can be a 349 
precursor of the real physical base of the mental event or an effect following the mental event (Aru et 350 
al., 2012). Since we are dealing with complex systems and different explanatory levels, we have to be 351 
careful when operationalizing potential causal factors in experiments. 352 
To study causal processes in cognitive science is difficult, even without considering mental variables. 353 
The nervous system is not wired as a linear causal chain where X causes Y, causes Z, and so on. The 354 
brain consists of interconnected networks that operate on different anatomical scales and different 355 
timescales. For example, to investigate causal effects of the intention to move the hand on hand 356 
movements, we have to consider that the process is part of a network that depends on both long-range 357 
connectivity and local specification of function working in many hierarchical feedback loops 358 
(Rizzolatti and Luppino, 2001; Shadmehr and Krakauer, 2008). 359 
To ask whether a mental event M cause action Y is not different from asking if certain neural activity in 360 
the supplementary motor area (call this activity PSMA) cause Y. To infer this relation following the 361 
principles of causal inference, we make an intervention on PSMA while keeping everything else in the 362 
brain is unaffected. If we find that the intervention on PSMA changes Y, compared to an adequate control 363 
condition, we can conclude that PSMA causes Y. This does not mean PSMA is the only cause of Y nor that 364 
PSMA is an isolated cause of Y. We should not fool ourselves to believe that because we measure two 365 
events (PSMA and Y) in a complex system (the brain and its interaction with the environment) and study 366 
the effect, then nothing else of relevance is going on. There definitely would be in this example, e.g., 367 
the neural communication from cortical motor areas to the basal ganglia, thalamus, and the peripheral 368 
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nervous system, but in the experiment, we make sure that all these are constant to pursue the question 369 
aimed at PSMA. 370 
We cannot make inference about all the other variables from the experiment, we can only make an 371 
inference about the causal effect of PSMA. To ask if a single variable X causes Y is a simplification of the 372 
complex mechanisms we are dealing with. But it is a simplification for inferential purposes, not a 373 
simplification of how the system is. Estimating a causal effect of X on Y does not tell us about the 374 
possible effects of other events Z1, Z2, etc. on Y or how they are related. It only gives the causal effect 375 
of X on Y. To test whether Z1, Z2, etc. are causes of Y, we need separate experiments for each type of 376 
event. The “start” and “end” of the relation are pragmatic cuts where we select events of the kind that 377 
we want to investigate from the larger configuration. 378 
Controlling variables “downwards” become increasingly difficult. Since we do not know the precise 379 
relation between the mental and physical, we might try to control for a physical variable that, unknown 380 
to us, is a part of the physical base of the mental event. 381 
The physical base of mental events is likely a complex system of interconnected processing between 382 
distinct sub-parts in a network (Baars, 2005; Tononi and Koch, 2015). Each node in the network is not 383 
enough to constitute the physical base of M. Only all parts connected are sufficient to enable M. 384 
Let us continue the example above to make inference about the lower level configuration of PSMA. SMA 385 
is divided into fine-grained anatomy based on local functionality and afferent connections (Nachev et 386 
al., 2008). Assume we can divide PSMA into four parts, as illustrated in Figure 4. All parts have to be 387 
“active” to constitute PSMA (and thereby M). By replacing the unified base P with the parts in the data-388 
frame for the causal experiment, we get Table 4. All parts, which together constitute the base of M, are 389 
perfect covariates with M as P were in Table 2. 390 
When we look at the parts, only P’4 has a direct causal link to outcome Y. If we were to intervene on 391 
P’4 in Figure 4 (keeping all other variables constant), we find that P’4 have a causal effect on Y. This 392 
time M is no longer a perfect co-variate: we see that M only occurs when all sub-components are 393 
present, as shown in Table 5. The conclusion we would draw from Table 4 (M cause Y) and Table 5 394 
(P’4 cause Y) are both correct. 395 
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 396 
Figure 4: M is realized by P, which is constituted by the parts P’1, P’2, P’3, and P’4. Om sub-part P’4 has a connection 397 
to Y. 398 
 399 
Table 4: Data frame for estimating the causal effect of mental event M on outcome variable Y 400 
with measurements of low-level parts of P. 401 
case B1 B2 P’1 P’2 P’3 P’4 M Y(X=1) Y(X=0) Y(X=1)-Y(X=0) 
i1 5 3 1 1 1 1 1 10 NA NA 
j1 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 NA 0 NA 
i2 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 NA NA 
j2 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 NA 0 NA 
i3 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 9 NA NA 
j3 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 NA 0 NA 
MEAN        10 0 10 
 402 
Table 5: Data frame for estimating causal effect similar to Table 4, but for the causal effect of a 403 
low-level part of P on outcome variable Y instead of mental event M. 404 
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case B1 B2 P’1 P’2 P’3 M P’4 Y(X=1) Y(X=0) Y(X=1)-Y(X=0) 
i1 5 3 1 1 1 1 1 10 NA NA 
j1 4 2 1 0 1 0 0 NA 0 NA 
i2 6 1 0 1 0 0 1 11 NA NA 
j2 5 3 1 1 0 0 0 NA 0 NA 
i3 4 2 1 0 0 0 1 9 NA NA 
j3 6 1 0 0 1 0 0 NA 0 NA 
MEAN        10 0 10 
 405 
It might appear paradoxical that M (together with P) can both be a cause of Y and, at the same time, be 406 
controlled when estimating the causal effect of only a part of P. The apparent discrepancy is because 407 
the two tables represent two different causal experiments. Causal effects are about the variable 408 
manipulated by the intervention. They do not tell us about the causal impact of other factors. We can 409 
for example not conclude that there is no effect of P’1, P’2, P’3, or M from the experiment in Table 5. 410 
We can only conclude that there is an effect of P’4 om Y. How we define the events, we investigate, 411 
determines the explanations we can give based on the causal inference. 412 
To conclude that “higher order” events are causally irrelevant is not possible from the observation that 413 
only a subset of low-level components has a causal effect on the outcome. Demonstrating that P’4 is the 414 
part of P that cause Y, does not mean that P is not also a cause of Y. The explanation containing P’4 is a 415 
fine-grained causal explanation that the one containing P or M, but it does not follow the higher order 416 
elements are irrelevant. Stating that a mental event is the cause of action does not exclude causal 417 
explanations in terms of neural mechanisms, nor does causal explanations in terms of neural 418 
mechanisms exclude causal explanations involving mental events (Pernu, 2011). 419 
6 Inferring mental and non-mental causes 420 
It is tempting to treat mental variables and physical variables as measures of different ontological levels 421 
and contrast the two variables to answer whether the physical event or mental event is the cause of Y. 422 
But this is not possible. Mental events are realized by physical events that might be contained in the 423 
measured physical variable. Similar, we cannot per default claim that no mental events are occurring 424 
when we measure physical variables; especially when the type of measured physical event is part of the 425 
organ that generates the mental events. It is only possible to claim that a physical variable represents an 426 
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unconscious (non-mental) cause of action if no mental variables influence the outcome. It is not enough 427 
to show that a physical variable influences the outcome to conclude that mental events are irrelevant for 428 
action. For example, movement-related cortical potentials precede the intention to move the hand 429 
(Fried et al., 2011; Libet et al., 1983), which is taken to prove that the intention to move is not a cause 430 
of moving the hand—the true cause is unconscious neural processes expressed as the movement-related 431 
cortical potentials (Harris, 2012; Libet, 1999, 1985; Wegner, 2002). 432 
Showing that a physical variable (movement-related potentials) precedes a mental variable (the 433 
intention to move) is not enough to infer that the former is the cause of outcome rather than the latter. 434 
The observation lacks a contrasting condition to rule out if there is a causal effect of the intention on 435 
the outcome. It is impossible to infer that the intention is not a cause of moving the hand from the 436 
observation. It is even impossible to infer that the movement-related potentials are the cause of moving 437 
the hand. Precedence does not imply causation. We can only claim that an action is unconsciously 438 
initiated if we show both a causal effect of the unconscious processes and a null-effect of the mental 439 
event. To infer true unconscious causes of action, we must include mental events as background 440 
variables to show that mental events do not covary with the unconscious events. 441 
For example, it is unclear how the movement-related potentials mentioned above are related to the 442 
conscious intention to move. Whether they reflect unconscious neural activity is unknown. Some 443 
studies have shown covariation of the readiness potential and conscious intention, while others are 444 
unable to do so (Haggard and Eimer, 1999; Keller and Heckhausen, 1990; Schlegel et al., 2013; 445 
Schultze-Kraft et al., 2016; Vinding et al., 2014). To conclude that a physical variable represents 446 
genuine unconscious action initiation it must be shown that it has a causal effect while keeping the 447 
mental content constant. 448 
It is surprisingly difficult to determine what non-mental or unconscious means (Moors and De Houwer, 449 
2006). It is not as simple as dividing mental/conscious and non-mental/non-conscious processes: the 450 
transition can be gradual (Miller and Schwarz, 2014; Sandberg et al., 2011), and there are separate 451 
ways to be unconscious of stimuli (Kim and Blake, 2005; Rothkirch and Hesselmann, 2017). In 452 
conclusion: it is not valid to ignore mental events altogether and conclude that the action was 453 
unconsciously initiated. If we want to show that a low-level neural event is the cause of action rather 454 
than mental events, then it requires a null-effect of the relevant mental variable. 455 
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7 Conclusion 456 
The complexity of the nervous system makes investigating mental causation a difficult task. But it is 457 
possible to study mental causation by applying the principles of causal inference as in any scientific 458 
field. Given the special nature of mental events, we need to treat the mental event and its physical base 459 
as one factor in the experimental design. This means that we cannot answer whether a mental event or 460 
its physical base is the cause of action. The type of questions we can answer is whether a given mental 461 
event M (realized by P) is a cause of Y. Mental causation is measured as the causal effect of MP on Y in 462 
controlled experiments with contrasting conditions that control for confounding variables. This 463 
approach is not for those who seek an either/or answer to mental causation, but it is of relevance to 464 
those who seek to investigate the neurocognitive and behavioral relevance of mental events. Causal 465 
effects are in any instance relative contributions of the variables—not ontological truths. 466 
To investigate the mental causation, we have to think about mental causation as relative contributions 467 
of events in complex systems with different descriptive levels. The different descriptive levels do not 468 
preclude one another. Experimental scientists must shift their approach to mental causation from the 469 
search for ultimate answers in the analytical discussion and instead focus on relative effects of well-470 
operationalized variables. Cognitive scientists have to consider how to manipulate mental events in 471 
experimental design and how to control confounding variables. The solution will depend on the type of 472 
mental event and outcome behavior in question. Note that these considerations are methodological, not 473 
metaphysical. 474 
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